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"A Necessary Supplement" 
What the United Nations Global Compact Is and Is Not 
 
Abstract 
 
The United Nations Global Compact is with currently over 6,000 voluntary participants the 
world’s largest corporate citizenship initiative. Although having made much progress towards its 
goals, the Compact still faces a lot of criticism. This paper first analyzes three critical allegations 
often made against the Compact by looking at the academic and non-academic literature. (1) The 
Compact supports the capture of the UN by “big business”. (2) Its ten principles are vague and 
thus hard to implement. (3) The Compact is not accountable due to an absence of verification 
mechanisms. This article discusses these three allegations and argues that they rest on a 
misunderstanding of (a) the nature of the Compact, as well as its mandate and (b) the goals it 
tries to achieve. From this discussion of what the Compact is not, the article then outlines a 
perspective that classifies the initiative as a necessary supplement to incomplete state and non-
state regulatory approaches in order to illustrate what the Compact is. The article argues that 
critics neglect this important supplementary role of the Compact. This neglect leads to an 
underestimation of the Compact’s true potential. Based on this discussion, the article looks at 
specific ways of improving the Compact and the challenges that must be understood when 
considering the rapid growth of the initiative.  
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Since its operational launch in 2000, the United Nations Global Compact has attracted both 
a lot of support and criticism. The Compact represents the world’s largest network-based 
voluntary corporate citizenship initiative (Hemphill, 2005). The term “corporate citizenship” is 
adopted here from the literature as a descriptor for a voluntary change of business practices to 
meet the responsibilities imposed on firms by their stakeholders (Norman & Néron, 2008). It is, 
however, outside the scope of this article to undertake a careful delineation of the similarities and 
differences with “corporate responsibility”. Although having made progress in terms of the large 
number of business and non-business participants (now numbering 6,000) and its likely impact 
on business practices (McKinsey (2007) concludes that nine out of ten participants are doing 
more towards the Compact’s principles than they did five years ago), this progress also brought 
about a lot of criticism, largely from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academics and 
the wider press. Thérien and Pouliot (2006, p. 67), for instance, argue that the Compact fosters a 
“pro-market spin” that breaks with the UN’s traditional position and thus is eroding its 
legitimacy in the long run. Amnesty International (2003) complains about the missing 
accountability of the initiative and asks for a more rigorous assessment of whether participants 
are really complying with the principles. In a more radical way, Sethi (2003, p. 2) argues that the 
Compact “provides a venue for opportunistic companies to make grandiose statements of 
corporate citizenship without worrying about being called to account for their actions.”  
Even though in order to gain a balanced view of the Compact critical concerns need to be 
voiced (some of which demand institutional changes that run counter to the very idea of the 
initiative and its reason for existence), these criticisms must be examined and carefully 
evaluated. For future critical discussions to be meaningful and to provide possible pointers for 
improvement, the discussion about the Global Compact needs to (a) show more sensitivity to the 
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underlying core idea of the initiative, which is long-term learning experience and not regulation, 
and (b) address the constraints of the institutional framework in which the initiative is embedded. 
So far, there has been no systematic assessment of the critical voices that are raised, let alone 
attempts to clarify some of the misconceptions upon which they are based. Given the rise in the 
number of articles that criticize the Compact (Deva, 2006; Nolan, 2005; Rizvi, 2004; Thérien & 
Pouliot, 2006; Zammit, 2003), there is a need to clarify what the initiative is and is not. 
This article has three main research objectives. First, it aims at structuring existing 
critiques of the Compact and offers an alternative perspective on the demands they place on the 
initiative. The article intends to show that much of the criticism is based on a misunderstanding 
of the nature and mandate of the Compact. Second, the article delineates a perspective that 
classifies the Compact as a necessary supplement to more regulative undertakings within the 
sphere of corporate citizenship (e.g., auditable standards for workplace conditions such as SA 
8000 or regulation by governments). This discussion illustrates what the Compact is and, most of 
all, what it is not and how future critical assessments, although much welcome to further spur its 
expansion by providing needed expertise, should identify the initiative. Third, the article outlines 
future challenges for the Compact and thus highlights the remaining actions that need to be taken 
in order to secure its continued success.  
To achieve these research objectives, the remainder of this paper is divided into five 
sections: The first section provides a brief introduction to the Global Compact as of 2008. As the 
Compact is an evolutionary framework that is continuously extended and modified, this 
descriptive exercise is necessary to paint a fair picture. The second section maps existing 
critiques of the Compact into three commonly-mentioned categories and assesses their viability 
when considering the goals of the initiative, as well as the overall institutional context of the 
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United Nations. The third section classifies the Compact as a necessary supplement to regulatory 
approaches and thus highlights what the initiative is about and on which grounds it should to be 
judged. This discussion helps future criticism to be presented in a way that is more compatible 
with the nature of the Compact and also allows for a better understanding of the relationship 
between the Compact and other initiatives (e.g., SA 8000). While the fourth section discusses 
existing challenges that the initiative has to address in order to achieve future growth and 
continued relevance, the fifth section provides a brief conclusion, including suggestions for 
further research.  
 
The United Nations Global Compact 
What Is the Nature and Mission of the Global Compact? 
On January 31, 1999 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan outlined the need for 
what he then called a “global compact” while speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos.  
Annan proposed that “you, the business leaders gathered in Davos, and we, the United Nations, 
initiate a global compact of shared values and principles, which will give a human face to the 
global market” (United Nations, 1999, p. 1). This speech would mark the birth of a global 
corporate citizenship initiative which was formally launched on July 26, 2000 at UN 
headquarters in New York with the support of multinational companies, UN agencies, global 
trade unions and a variety of NGOs.  
The Global Compact engages the private sector to collaborate with the United Nations – in 
partnership with global labor, NGOs and academia to identify and spread good corporate 
practices in the areas of human rights, labor rights, protection of the environment and anti-
corruption (Ruggie, 2001, p. 371; Ruggie, 2002, p. 301). The Compact seeks to weave a web of 
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joint values around the global economy; a web that is based on ten universal principles (see 
Figure 1). The goals of the Compact are thus based on the distinction between a macro and 
micro-level: on the macro-level the Compact facilitates cooperation, long-term learning and 
collective problem solving among a full cast of stakeholders, whereas on the micro-level it wants 
participants to internalize its principles into their strategy and daily operations.  
------------------------------- 
Put Figure 1 About Here  
------------------------------- 
 
The Compact is not designed as a certification instrument or tool to regulate and sanction 
its participants, but instead to foster a dialogue among a diverse set of actors in a non-
bureaucratic way. Participating companies are required to be transparent about their engagement 
by reporting on progress and action with regards to their implementation efforts. The change 
model that underlies the Compact is based on the idea that corporations, through dialogue and 
partnership projects, can show responsibility and make a difference once they learn from each 
other and other actors (e.g., UN agencies). This is not to imply that binding regulations are not 
needed, but that regulations must be complemented by a dialogue-based approach that gives 
reference to the fact that most companies still have a lot to learn when it comes to managing 
social, environmental and governance issues. The initiative is based on the idea of “principled 
pragmatism” which reflects the need to balance what is ideally expected to exist in the sphere of 
regulation with what is achievable given the current political environment.  
 
Why Is There a Need for a Global Compact? 
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There are many reasons why a globally-valid initiative that fosters the development and 
dissemination of shared values and their integration into the conduct of corporations makes 
sense. Some advocates of the Compact argue from a moral perspective. Williams (2004, p. 760), 
for instance, states that the Compact is needed because corporations have to respect (and cannot 
simply neglect) that they have a moral purpose as long as they want to be seen as a legitimate 
part of national societies and the emerging global order. Others, like Ruggie (2001, 2002), 
underline the business case by arguing that some corporations, by learning from other 
participants, avoid costly mistakes that their peers have committed.  
This article highlights another dimension of reasoning that is often neglected when it 
comes to looking at why initiatives such as the Global Compact are needed. When focusing on 
changes in the global economic order, characterized in part by a globalization of problems facing 
mankind (e.g., climate change and poverty) and the increased politicized role of multinational 
corporations (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Windsor, 2007), one must recognize that these changes 
can only be addressed once businesses, civil society, and governments devise for the global 
economy the kind of institutional equilibrium that existed in the postwar international economic 
order (Kell & Ruggie, 1999, p. 103). In other words, a stable institutional framework is needed 
for doing business under the conditions of globalization. The need for such a framework creates 
two key challenges; on the macro-level there is the challenge to embed the global market in a 
network of shared values, whereas on the micro-level these values have to be implemented in the 
conduct of (multinational) businesses.  
On the macro-level, the Global Compact is needed to address the omnipresent governance 
gaps that the rise of the global economy has created (e.g., with regard to environmental policy). 
The United Nations, as the only truly global inter-governmental organization with a 
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comprehensive mandate (Cohen, 2001, p. 185), provides the right framework to address these 
gaps. Although the Compact is by no means a substitute for national or international regulations 
and also not an all-inclusive framework for global governance, it is at least a first pragmatic 
response to government governance failures and defines an agenda for discussing issues of 
global governance (Kell, 2005, p. 78). Compact participants acknowledge that there is neither the 
time nor the need to wait until national governments “get it right” and international law sets 
binding regulations. The communicative, learning-based framework of the initiative needs to be 
understood as a supplement to existing and emerging regulatory efforts in the global business 
environment. Understanding the Compact as a supplement reflects the conviction that the 
governance battle cannot be won until it is based on new forms of social engagement that 
connect all relevant social actors (Ruggie, 2002, p. 298). Learning about macro-level governance 
problems is even more important when considering that the Compact has attracted a variety of 
major firms from emerging markets like China (Nash, 2003). Since these companies often lack 
knowledge on the relevance of social and environmental responsibility, they can, as Compact 
participants, start developing that kind of knowledge.  
This discussion raises the question of how the relationship between the problem addressed 
by the Compact on the macro-level (i.e. global governance) and its proposed solution (i.e. 
learning and shared values) is intended to be understood. Following Rosenau (1992), global 
governance is the worldwide achievement of order through the issuance of systems of rule to 
address those governance problems that cannot be solved by sovereign national governments. 
Mechanisms of global governance include binding international law (e.g., the WTO) and/or soft 
law approaches (e.g., the Global Compact). Although binding international law is desirable, 
mutual learning and a set of shared values is indispensable for global governance to function. 
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The complexity of global governance problems requires taking multiple levels (e.g. national and 
international), as well as a variety of actors from different domains (e.g., the economy, politics 
and civil society) into account (Dingwert & Pattberg, 2006). Learning mechanisms and a set of 
shared values, as promoted by the Compact, help to establish a ground upon which solutions for 
complex governance problems can be discussed and advanced. In addition, learning mechanisms 
also allow spreading already available solutions across levels and actors (Kell, 2005).  
On the micro-level, the Compact is needed to deal with the challenge of implementing and 
acting upon the values that are defined on the macro-level. Even though the Compact does not 
sanction or monitor but instead relies upon the enlightened self-interest of corporations to give 
specific meaning to its underlying principles within their day-to-day conduct, another reason for 
its existence is to help change corporate behavior. This goal reflects a specific perspective on 
corporate responsibility in general and corporate citizenship in particular. Participants are asked 
to move beyond a philanthropic understanding of citizenship, dominated by charitable donations 
and other forms of community actions (Carroll, 1991) and to instead change their core-business 
practices (Birch, 2001). Such an expansionist definition of corporate citizenship (Norman & 
Néron, 2008) assumes that businesses promote and participate in multi-stakeholder partnerships 
in order to identify and learn about their constituencies (Poncelet, 2003).  
 
How Does the Global Compact Work?  
To understand how the Compact “works”, one needs to appreciate its constituent actors 
and their respective roles. Essentially, there are four core actors that create the Global Compact 
network (Kell & Levin, 2003). First, there is the United Nations system with its various agencies 
and offices. The Global Compact Office (that belongs to the UN Secretary-General’s Executive 
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Office) sets the administrative frame, provides strategic direction and performs quality control 
tasks. In addition, six UN agencies (i.e. the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
International Labour Organization, the UN Environmental Programme, the UN Development 
Programme, the UN Industrial Development Organization, and the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime) offer expertise in special areas in order to set up and steer particular UN-business 
partnership projects that are created under the umbrella of the initiative.  
Second, businesses are at the heart of the Compact. With currently over 4,700 corporate 
participants from developing and developed countries, businesses are encouraged to actively 
participate in dialogue and integrate the ten principles in their operations. Participating firms are 
required to not only publicly advocate the Global Compact (e.g., via press releases and speeches) 
but also to disclose annually how the ten principles are implemented and what progress has been 
achieved by submitting a so-called Communication on Progress (COP) report. Third, 
governments facilitate the ten principles by setting up regulatory frameworks on a national and 
supra-national level. The legal environment created acts as an enabling force that underpins and 
strengthens the ten principles.  
Finally, civil society organizations and labor play a crucial role because they have 
competence and substantive knowledge with regard to practical problems. On the side of labor, 
the international trade union movement offers problem-solving competence concerning the 
implementation of the four labor-related principles. Civil society is mostly represented by non-
governmental organizations. Many NGOs are increasingly referred to as partners that provide 
contextualized knowledge to businesses regarding projects that support the ten principles. NGOs 
also play a vital role within the dialogue and learning activities since they possess specialized 
knowledge about particular issues (e.g., HIV/AIDS) that often become even more focused once a 
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national or regional context is taken into account. Furthermore, NGOs act as watchdog 
institutions that speak up if business participants violate any of the principles.  
The Compact links these actors through three engagement mechanisms; learning events, 
dialogue events and partnership projects. The three mechanisms serve the two major goals of the 
Compact (see above) since they (a) enable business and non-business actors to create, discuss, 
modify and extend a set of shared values within the global marketplace and (b) allow 
corporations to implement these values into their operations by sharing ideas and best practices. 
The engagement mechanisms are designed to function both at the global and national/regional 
level. On the national/regional level engagement is ensured through so-called local networks, 
which have been established in over 70 countries thus far. Local networks serve as a platform to 
create a close link between contextualized problems on the local level and the more abstract 
ideas and commitments that are developed at the global level. Networks are “translators” of the 
created global solutions and, at the same time, “innovators” looking for ways to implement the 
ten principles given the constraints and opportunities of a local context. In the following, the 
three engagement mechanisms are introduced and their role on the global and national/regional 
level described (see Figure 2).  
 
------------------------------- 
Put Figure 2 About Here  
------------------------------- 
 
 By partnership projects the Global Compact means active collaboration between business, 
civil society and governments under the umbrella of the ten principles. Partnerships seek to 
discover a common ground of interests between the private and the public sector and thus 
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combine and leverage available skills and resources on both sides. Often partnerships occur in 
direct support of issues discussed at the different loci for dialogue. DaimlerChrysler, for instance, 
has set up a project together with the German Development Agency (GTZ) to tackle the rise of 
HIV/AIDS in South Africa. This project is in direct support of the 2003 Global Compact Policy 
Dialogue on this topic. Whereas some partnership projects are embedded in a local context, 
others have a more global reach. Deutsche Telekom, for example, has started a Global 
Communication Initiative that aims to bridge the digital divide across different parts of the 
world.  
Dialogue events are about identifying new and emergent issues that relate to any of the ten 
principles. However, it also attempts to build relationships and trust with other actors (e.g., by 
entering into partnership projects). On the global level, the Compact has created a variety of 
Policy Dialogues that focus on specific issues (e.g., the role of the private sector in conflict 
zones). These meetings act as an international platform to discuss problems and to gain mutual 
understanding about possible solutions. Another form of global dialogue is the triennial Global 
Compact Leaders Summit which brings together executives from business and non-business 
participants to chart the strategic course of the Compact itself. On the local level, networks are 
encouraged to facilitate dialogue on issues that are relevant to them and share the ideas 
developed at regional network conferences. Dialogue at the local level is especially valuable as it 
allows previously unconnected actors (such as SMEs) to enter into partnerships with other 
business and non-business participants.  
Learning events are closely related to dialogue, however focus more on sharing pre-
existing solutions and best practices and thus do not specifically aim to find new ways to 
promote the ten principles. Learning is crucial as participants can learn from available good 
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practices and thus follow notable examples that were developed under consideration of their 
region and sector. On the global level, learning occurs through direct interaction, such as at the 
International Learning Forum Meeting and also the Global Compact website. Corporations are 
asked to submit case studies and descriptions of best practices to the web portal to enable other 
participants to replicate and thus propagate available solutions. The Compact Office has also 
published a case study series that cluster examples (Global Compact, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004, 
2006). At the local level, network meetings serve as a basis for learning and dissemination of 
best practices. Networks enable participants to learn from one another taking into account the 
constraints and opportunities of their region and/or sector. The UK network, for instance, has set 
up a peer review process of submitted COPs which allows participants to learn how to improve 
the quality of their COPs.  
The three engagement mechanisms work together (e.g., projects also create learning 
effects) as indicated by the arrows in Figure 2. Engagement mechanisms alone do not ensure that 
a participant fulfills the two goals that the Compact serves. Rather, engagement by participating 
in learning, dialogue and partnership projects needs to be backed up by implementation of the 
principles throughout a participant’s value chain.  
 
The Global Compact and its Critics – An Assessment  
Since its inception, the Global Compact has faced a lot of criticism from a variety of 
sources. This article looks at the three most often-mentioned: i.e. that (1) the Compact supports 
the capture of the UN by “big business”, (2) its principles are vague and thus hard to implement 
and (3) it is not accountable due to missing verification mechanisms. The following discussion 
shows that this criticism is, at least in part, based on a misunderstanding of the initiative and its 
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underlying institutional framework. Other, less frequently-mentioned criticisms include an 
observed “non-seriousness” of participants (Deva, 2006, p. 113) and an over-focus on the 
participation of Western MNCs compared to SMEs from the developing world (Transnational 
Resource and Action Center, 2000). 
 
Allegation 1: The Compact Supports the “Capture” of the UN by Big Business 
One common allegation raised by critical parties is that the Compact opens a window of 
opportunity for business to capture the UN. Zammit (2003, p. xxi), for example, argues that there 
is a basic inconsistency between the policy interests of developing countries and those promoted 
by the UN’s corporate partners. The fear is that big business will pursue its policy interests 
within the UN more directly by signing up to initiatives like the Global Compact. Such a view is 
also adopted by Nolan (2005, p. 465) who states that “[c]lose relations between the UN and big 
business provides ample scope for ‘capture’ such that the UN, the supposed rule setter, wittingly 
or otherwise begins to adopt the agenda of business partners without debate or true democratic 
procedure.” Thérien and Pouliot (2006, p. 67) thus conclude that the creation of the Global 
Compact has fuelled concerns about a break in the UN’s traditional, non-business position on 
economic issues. Furthermore it raises concerns that the institution adopts a “pro-market spin” 
that could, in time, lead to its silent privatization.  
There are, however, at least two issues that should be taken into consideration here. First, 
the Global Compact is by no means the first, nor the only attempt to establish partnerships 
between the UN and business. Almost from its inception, the UN has had partnerships with 
businesses and business associations. Businesses and NGOs even joined the 51 nations that 
gathered in San Francisco, CA in 1945 to sign the UN Charter, and were expected to be part of 
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the solution to foster peace and development. However, owing to increasing media coverage, 
most partnerships have only recently entered the wider public consciousness. For instance, at the 
2002 Johannesburg World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) over 240 partnerships 
were announced, most of which were in the field of water and energy use (James, 2002). UN-
business partnerships are neither a new nor exclusive feature of the Global Compact, however 
they have increased in number over the last decade. This increase may be due to the fact that 
many UN agencies have undergone an ideological change from confrontation to cooperation 
with regard to partnerships (Cohen, 2001; Kell, 2005). There is, of course, the question of why 
this change has occurred and whether it reflects a “capture” of the UN by business or whether it 
is simply in response to the rise of global markets and growing governance gaps at the local and 
global level. This question brings us to the second point.  
It is important to understand that it is not the Global Compact that allows corporations to 
be closer to the agenda of policy makers at the UN but that corporations are already political 
players, quite independently of the Compact (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). Corporations design and 
implement social and environmental standards (McIntosh, Thomas, Coleman, & Leipziger, 
2003), are involved in peacekeeping (Fort & Schipani, 2002), provide education and healthcare 
(Williams, 2004) and fight corruption (Cavanagh, 2004). All of these issues are also on the UN 
agenda. This engagement has not been imposed on MNCs but is necessary since (a) national 
governments, especially in developing countries, increasingly fail to set a regulative framework 
under which such issues can be resolved and (b) many of today’s problems cannot be solved on a 
national level at all but need to be addressed globally, for example by multinational companies 
(Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006). Under these conditions, collaboration between the UN 
and business is not only desirable but also needed as the UN’s goals can no longer be achieved 
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without collaboration with business (Bigge, 2004, p. 10; Kell, 2005, p. 71). In a world of 
growing interdependencies, neglecting and devaluing UN-business partnerships can only come at 
the price of sticking to existing ideologies. There is no basic inconsistency between the goals of 
business and the UN; both are interested in the existence of a stable global market that is 
sustainable and based on a social consensus of shared values. Neglecting this relationship may be 
possible in the short run but will go against the UN’s mission over a longer timeframe.  
UN-business partnerships are, of course, not without problems. It is not the direct capture 
of the UN by businesses but instead the ability of the latter to use the Compact as a means to 
position a specific idea of what corporate citizenship is about (i.e. learning not regulation) that 
needs to be watched carefully. As discussed below, learning is a supplement, but not a substitute, 
for regulation. For corporations, the UN is particularly attractive in this context as influencing 
the public understanding of what “good” corporate citizenship is about requires discursive 
legitimacy (among other things) which the UN clearly offers (Levy, 2008; Levy & Prakash, 
2003). Since the majority of Compact participants are businesses or business associations, the 
initiative needs to ensure that the perspectives of multiple stakeholders are taken into 
consideration when shaping and framing the public understanding and expectation towards 
corporate citizenship.  
 
Allegation 2: The Compact’s Principles are Vague and Thus Hard to Implement 
The second criticism pertains to the Compact’s lack of clarity with regard to its principles. 
Deva (2006, p. 129), for instance, notes that the principles hardly provide concrete guidance to 
corporations about the expected conduct. Requirements such as “action needs to be taken within 
a firm’s sphere of influence” miss the precision necessary for a viable code of conduct. Deva 
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(2006, p. 129) further argues that “the language of these principles is so general that insincere 
corporations can easily circumvent or comply with them without doing anything.” Similarly, 
Nolan (2005, p. 460) and Bigge (2004, p. 11) claim that the Compact is surrounded by a lack of 
precision in content that does not even attempt to clarify its principles for its participants. 
Murphy (2005, p. 389) thus concludes that the Compact is at best a minimalist code of corporate 
conduct.  
First of all, one must recognize that many of these critics want the Compact to be a clearly 
structured code of conduct against which compliance can be measured. However, as already 
mentioned, the very idea of the Compact is the creation of a long-term learning network that is 
used by business and non-business participants to share innovative ideas and best practices as to 
how the ten principles can be implemented. These principles provide a yardstick for the 
exchange of ideas, learning and discussion and are not meant to be a benchmark against which to 
assess compliance. The goal is to establish consensus and best practices on what, for instance “a 
precautionary approach to environmental challenges” means within a firm’s respective region 
and sector. Over-specified principles could even turn out to be counterproductive as they would 
limit the scope of possible solutions right from the beginning. The ten principles rather provide 
corporations with the opportunity and highlight the need to “fill” their general character with 
context specific meaning.  
Thinking about context uncovers yet another reason for the general character of the 
principles. Although regional in its impact, the Global Compact is designed as a global initiative 
with no restrictions on the size, sector or region of its participants. Currently, 52% of all business 
participants are small and medium-sized enterprises coming mainly from Europe, Latin America 
and Asia (Global Compact, 2007). The wide variety in corporate size, sector, region and 
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available resources of participating companies does not allow for the introduction of clear-cut 
principles. For instance, a “precautionary approach to environmental challenges” has a different 
meaning for a large MNC operating in the chemical sector, compared to an Indian SME doing 
business in the IT industry. It is in this spirit that the UNDP-sponsored handbook for 
implementing the Global Compact recognizes that “company approaches [toward the ten 
principles] are very different. It highlights the flexibility of the Compact and the fact that there is 
considerable scope for adapting the initiative to the specific needs and situation of the individual 
participant.” (UNDP, 2005, p. 8) 
It is the very idea of the Compact acting as a moral compass for participants (Kell, 2003, p. 
47); a compass that addresses corporate diversity through a learning-based approach which 
allows firms to contextualize the general principles within their respective business context. The 
bottom line is that there are a variety of ways to implement the ten principles: The Compact’s 
values need to be translated into action, a task (like any other management task) that can be 
approached from different angles.  
 
Allegation 3: The Compact Is Not Accountable Due to Missing Verification 
The last allegation, that the Compact is not accountable because it does not independently 
monitor and verify compliance with its principles, is probably the most well known critique that 
has appeared consistently for the last eight years in the academic and non-academic press 
(recently see Bigge, 2004, p. 12; Deva, 2006, p. 146; Engardio, 2004, p. 86; Nolan, 2005; Rizvi, 
2004; Thérien & Pouliot, 2006, p. 67). It is in this spirit that Nolan (2005, p. 462) argues that 
“accountability, or rather the lack of it, is the crucial issue that faces the Global Compact.” 
Critics argue that a lack of serious monitoring, sanctions, enforceable rules and independent 
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verification fosters the misuse of the Compact as a marketing tool (Deva, 2006; Rizvi, 2004). In 
the eyes of these critics the Compact is a public relations smokescreen without substance that 
allows powerful MNCs to “bluewash” their damaged image. In other words, they seek to 
associate their operations with the blue UN flag in order to gain legitimacy. Ultimately, the fear 
is that such a lack of accountability can lead to adverse selection in that those companies most 
eager to join are the ones in need of a good public image (Williams, 2004, p. 762).  
In order to address this allegation in a comprehensive way, two issues need to be discussed 
and understood. First, one cannot and should not criticize the Compact for something it has never 
pretended or intended to be; a compliance-based mechanism that verifies and measures corporate 
behavior. From its inception, the initiative was never designed as a seal of approval for 
participating companies as certification would require far more resources than are currently 
available. The Compact instead expects proactive behavior from its participants. Its learning 
approach is advantageous insofar as a code of conduct (that would be needed for monitoring) is 
always static and thus does not allow participants to react flexibly to varying environmental 
circumstances (Ruggie, 2002, p. 304). Without a doubt, it should be in the enlightened self-
interest of the Compact to prevent free-riders from misusing the initiative. However, the 
prevention of opportunistic behavior does not ultimately require close monitoring of corporate 
actions. The decision faced by rule-setters is not between fully monitoring corporate behavior or 
not monitoring at all. Rather, there is something in between.  
For the Compact this “in between” is reflected by demanding that its participants report on 
progress they have made in implementing the principles on an annual basis. The above-
mentioned COP policy allows the Global Compact Office to gain an overview of a company’s 
bottom-line activities. Although the Compact does not yet require standardized COP reports, it 
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encourages its participants to follow the recently released G3-guidelines of the Global Reporting 
Initiative (Global Reporting Initiative, 2007). Since COPs are primarily aimed at participants’ 
stakeholders, they foster a social vetting mechanism that is intended to increase report content 
and quality over time. Social vetting means that other parties (e.g., NGOs) are asked to use 
submitted COPs as  grounds to judge corporate behavior and file complaints that the Compact 
can use as a basis for investigations. If a company fails to submit a COP report within a year it is 
labeled “non-communicating”, while after a second year of non-reporting the firm is labeled 
“inactive” and completely delisted after yet another year of non-communication. This policy has 
already led to 945 participants being labeled “non-communicating”, 263 as “inactive” and 630 
being permanently delisted (data as of July 2008). The case for ensuring accountability by 
demanding COPs is a good one as its content needs to be publicized in prominent documents 
(e.g., the annual report) which usually are approved by a company’s board.  
A second issue that deserves attention here is the question of whether verification, although 
not the aim of the Compact, would be achievable at all. Three points are important in this 
context: (1) the development of indicators; (2) the issuance of a mandate and (3) the accessibility 
of resources.  
(1) First, even if desired by the Compact, monitoring of participants would be nearly 
impossible as it requires performance indicators relevant to all companies in all 
countries and sectors. Without such measures a meaningful comparison of monitoring 
results, and thus the creation of sanctions, is not only impossible but would also 
weaken the Compact’s accountability as any imposed sanctions would be perceived as 
arbitrary.  
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(2) Second, the Global Compact currently has no mandate to monitor or verify compliance 
with its principles. Since the initiative is embedded within the UN system, the 
establishment of legally-binding regulations would require the support of the UN 
General Assembly, which is unlikely given the current international political climate 
(Ruggie, 2002, p. 303). Even if such a compromise were to be established, it would 
reflect the “lowest common denominator” of the currently 193 UN Member States and 
thus echo a weak mandate. Attempts to transform the Compact into a code of conduct 
would not only miss political support but also not fit the current climate of cooperation 
and collaboration between the UN and business.  
(3) Third, the logistical and financial resources to effectively and efficiently monitor 
MNCs and their supply chains, let alone SMEs around the world are simply not 
available. Given that there are currently over 4,700 business participants, annual (or 
even biannual) monitoring of corporate behavior would require personal, logistical and 
financial resources that are way beyond the Compact’s current capacity. Nike, for 
instance, has over 750 direct suppliers in 52 countries. It is precisely for this reason 
that certification standards such as SA 8000 award certificates for just one production 
facility but never for an entire corporation and/or supply chain (Gilbert & Rasche, 
2007). The addressees of the Compact, however, are entire corporations and not single 
production facilities.  
To conclude, a variety of factors prevent the Compact from being a tool for regulation; 
most of all its underlying idea of creating space for learning and cooperation. Of course, 
measures such as the annually-required COP reports are essential to strengthen the case for 
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accountability. However on their own they do not reflect a compliance mechanism in the narrow 
sense.  
This in-depth discussion of the three allegations demonstrates that there is need to clarify 
the intent of the Compact. Discussing these allegations should not indicate that these critical 
voices do not deserve to be heard. The tensions they create can lead to productive discussions 
and even innovations to the initiative. Instead this article argues that there is need to be more 
careful when judging the initiative for something it never pretended or intended to be. In the 
following section, the role of the Compact as a supplement to national/international regulation 
and voluntary regulative standards (e.g., SA 8000) is outlined. This discussion is intended to lead 
future critical assessments in a more fruitful direction; a direction that enables the initiative to 
learn from and leverage the suggestions made by its critics.  
 
The Global Compact as a Necessary Supplement 
Whereas the last section discussed what the Global Compact is not, this section focuses on 
what the initiative is, with a focus on the contentious issues that were previously raised (e.g., lack 
of mandate and resources to monitor). Overall, this article argues that the Compact is best 
understood as something that necessarily supplements approaches with a regulative character 
towards corporate responsibility. Following Baldwin, Scott, & Hood (1998), regulation can be 
defined as something that transcends the law and includes all mechanisms of social control by 
state and non-state actors to direct corporate behavior according to predefined standards. In this 
sense, regulation is about sustained and focused control (Selznick, 1985, p. 363). The learning-
based approach of the Compact is a supplement to regulation because it should never replace 
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national and international regulatory systems. Instead it is useful where (1) corporations are 
willing but have trouble putting regulations into practice and thus need to learn about 
implementation and (2) where regulations fail or are ineffective and need further development. 
Both of these situations will be explained further.  
First, the Compact supplements regulation by national governments, intergovernmental 
institutions and compliance-based voluntary CSR-standards because it enables a learning process 
within corporations – a learning process that allows firms to establish compliance with these 
regulations in the first place. Regulation by itself is often limited in its potential because those 
who are regulated need to learn how to implement and “live” the letter of law. The myriad of 
corporate scandals around the globe shows that regulation by itself is in no way sufficient. 
Regulated parties need to find out what the letter of law means, how it can be implemented and, 
most of all, they need to be willing to carry out serious implementation efforts. The Compact 
helps corporations to address these issues by providing a forum that disseminates best practices 
and thus translates existing regulations (e.g., international law with regard to human rights 
issues) into real-life actions. Furthermore, it can also positively stimulate the motivation to 
comply with regulations by identifying notable best practices and thus exercise peer-pressure on 
competitors.  
Second, the Compact also supplements existing regulations whenever the latter are not 
working efficiently or are completely absent. For instance, in theory supplier factories in 
developing countries comply with employee protection codes (Webb, 2004, p. 6), whereas in 
practice there is little enforcement of these rules and voluntary, regulative instruments such as 
SA 8000 or the FLA workplace code only cover a small share of the overall number of workers. 
For other problems, for example climate change, there are no binding regulations at all. Of 
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course, the Compact does not define a regulatory framework to tackle climate change, however 
offers a forum where this issue can be discussed to develop measures that can act as a temporary 
solution until binding regulations emerge. The recently launched Caring for Climate platform 
shows that Compact participants (e.g., Deutsche Telekom and Unilever) have come up with a 
variety of innovative ways to address climate change within their business operations. Setting up 
the Caring for Climate platform does not indicate that there is no need for regulation to fight 
climate change, but that preliminary results are possible even in the absence of binding rules. 
Kofi Annan recognized this when referring to the Compact as a pragmatic interim solution with 
regard to existing governance gaps (United Nations, 2004). Talking about pragmatic solutions, of 
course, does not indicate that learning and the formulation of shared values solely fill the 
omnipresent governance gaps, nor does it mean that global governance can do without 
regulation. It merely stresses the fact that (a) interim solutions are necessary as long as binding 
global regulations are not in sight and (b) regulations always should be supplemented, not 
replaced, by a learning-based approach towards governance.   
In other words, there are two understandings of the Compact’s supplementary nature; the 
Compact as a supplement to learn about and action existing regulations and the Compact as a 
supplement to missing regulations. These two understandings reflect a necessity as every 
regulatory framework needs to be enacted by its addressees. The Compact provides a forum 
where such enactment can take place. Regulations, whether they be laws, standards or codes of 
conduct, need to be understood; otherwise they will be ineffective. The letter of the law remains 
useless as long as the spirit of the law stays unrecognized. By utilizing a variety of engagement 
and dialogue mechanisms, participants of the Compact make sense of existing regulations by 
sharing best practices and innovative solutions. Furthermore, regulations show a strong tendency 
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towards inflexibility and over-formality (Bardach & Kagan, 1982) which can lead to adversarial 
“going by the book” attitudes to compliance (Coglianese & Nash, 2001). The Compact is 
necessary in this context because it adds flexibility to existing regulations and thus allows for the 
inclusion of emerging topics (e.g., climate change).  
To conclude, in order to appreciate the nature of the Compact there is a need to leave the 
dichotomy of “effective regulation by law” versus “ineffective voluntary commitment to non-
regulating learning tools”. The choice is not one of an either/or-type but should reflect a both/and 
way of thinking. That is why this article characterizes the Compact as a supplement – something 
that adds-itself-to regulation but always requires further actions. The International Chamber of 
Commerce (2004, p. 1) echoes this by claiming that “the Global Compact’s greatest strength lies 
in its voluntary nature, which acts as a powerful complement to the necessary action by 
governments themselves to safeguard and advance its principles.”  
 
Moving Ahead – Perspectives and Challenges 
Although this article shows that some of the critical voices are based on a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the Compact and/or demand changes that are unlikely to occur 
in the current political climate of the UN, there are a variety of challenges that the Compact 
needs to address in order to maintain or even increase its relevance. This article highlights four 
issues which represent key success factors for the development of the initiative; (1) the 
management of growth, (2) the management of diversity, (3) the continued strengthening of 
accountability, and (4) the inclusion of financial markets. Of course, these are by no means the 
only challenges, as other important issues also exist. For example, the need for collaboration 
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with governments to strengthen the ten principles with binding regulations or the more active 
consideration of problems that relate to international supply chains. Hence, the following four 
issues do not represent an exclusive list but are indicative of future challenges, the discussion of 
which is beyond the scope of this article.  
Managing Growth. The first major challenge results from the tension that is created 
between the continued expansion of the initiative – from 50 participants in 2000 to over 6,000 in 
2008 – and the constraints of managing such a fast-growing and flexible network of actors within 
a rather rigid organization such as the UN. It is no secret that the UN system is overly-
characterized by a bureaucratic and hierarchical way of management that is not always in a 
position to provide quick responses to the emerging needs of a proliferating initiative such as the 
Global Compact. In particular, inter-agency collaboration and also collaboration of UN agencies 
with non-state actors cannot rely on the rather sticky UN-procedures for issuing mandates. 
Instead it needs to be driven by shared incentives, a decentralized decision-making style and 
commitment towards the Compact’s ten principles.  
There is also a danger that the Compact may become politicized in the sense that the UN 
demands intergovernmental oversight. Although the current mandate, backed by a General 
Assembly resolution (United Nations, 2001), gives the UN Secretariat clear responsibility for the 
Compact, this status needs to be maintained, especially when bearing in mind the expected 
further growth. The achievements of the Compact and its steady growth are based on its 
pragmatism and the network-based governance model underlying its operations; politicizing the 
initiative would put these two success factors at risk.  
Managing Diversity. A second challenge deals with achieving greater diversity in terms of 
corporate size, represented sectors and, most of all, the geographic spread of business 
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participants. Although some areas of the world have not yet attracted a lot of participants (e.g., 
the Middle East), it is especially remarkable that North American companies only comprise a 
small portion of the overall share of the Compact’s business participants (i.e. around 200; Global 
Compact, 2007). This number is particularly striking because North American (especially US) 
companies represent a much larger percentage of the world’s largest corporations according to 
the Fortune Global 500 index than their participation rate in the Compact indicates. One major 
reason is that North America is a more litigious society than Europe or Latin America. 
Companies are afraid of lawsuits that are filed by adversaries, accusing US participants of not 
complying with the principles (Hemphill, 2005, p. 312; Williams, 2004, p. 758). As Ziegler’s 
(2007) empirical study reveals, US participants often cite fear of litigation as an obstacle against 
membership in the Compact. This participation barely improved even after the Compact, 
together with the American Bar Association, developed a litigation-proof letter in 2004 which 
shields US participants from lawsuits based on claims that they failed to comply with the 
principles. Even though there is no evidence whether this letter holds the force of law, other 
reasons must also play a role.  
The reluctance of US businesses to join the Compact is also reflected by the ongoing fear 
of public criticism. As mentioned above (Allegation 3), there still is a lot of criticism of the 
Compact’s accountability. Thus, firms fear that once they join they will be accused of 
“bluewashing” their operations regardless of how well they implement the principles. In a time 
of increased transparency and media attention such assertions can be very harmful to a 
corporation’s public image. The Compact can only address this concern by (a) continuing to 
communicate the purpose of the initiative and strengthen existing integrity measures (e.g., the 
COP policy) and (b) supporting outreach activities through its established US local network. 
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Since the US hosts many MNCs, increased participation is not only desirable but also necessary 
to address issues related to global supply chains.  
Ensuring Accountability. A third challenge deals with further strengthening the 
accountability of the initiative in order to protect its integrity and ensure sustainable growth. 
Accountability is, among other things, directly linked to an organization’s ability to provide 
transparency of its operations and an evaluation of the progress and results against its goals and 
objectives (Blagescu & Lloyd, 2006; Rasche & Esser, 2006). To assess the accountability of the 
Compact, one needs to look at two inter-related issues; on the one hand information 
communicated by participants about their progress in implementing the principles and on the 
other, information regarding the impact communicated by the Compact itself. Concerning 
corporate reporting, there is a challenge to not only demand annual Communication on Progress, 
but also to ensure comparable quality of the submitted reports. Although the Compact has no 
authority to judge the actions of corporations, an industry-specific benchmarking system for the 
annually-submitted reports would help (a) to provide incentives for participants to submit 
improved reports as well as a guide to do so and (b) to increase the comparability of report 
content and thus foster learning and dialogue among participants. Achieving such a 
benchmarking system means to strengthen the already existing relationship with the Global 
Reporting Initiative to come up with a selection of mandatory core indicators for COP reports. In 
addition, the currently existing categories for failed COP reporting (i.e. non-communicating, 
inactive, delisted) should be merged into one category. This shortens the “grace period” for non-
reporters and thus provides incentives to submit a report on time.  
Regarding impact-related information communicated by the Compact itself, there has 
recently been much improvement. The UN Global Compact Annual Review (first introduced at 
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the 2007 Leaders Summit in Geneva) includes specific and comprehensive data on the overall 
progress of implementing the ten principles throughout the world. The challenge is to make this 
information more reliable by supplementing the (so far) quantitative survey-based data with 
more detailed qualitative interview-based data. For first attempts of this approach see 
Cetindamar & Husoy, (2007) and McKinsey & Company (2004). To date, a systematic effort to 
assess the impact of the Compact in a comprehensive manner has not been attempted, mostly due 
to the high costs of gathering and evaluating information at different levels of aggregation (Kell, 
2005, p. 63). The accountability of the initiative could be strengthened if a comprehensive 
impact assessment can be produced and disseminated on a regular basis. Impact assessments also 
need to show whether Compact-related projects by business participants are integrated into core-
business practices, as indicated by the initiative’s understanding of corporate citizenship (see 
above), or whether such projects reflect philanthropy and are thus isolated from a participant’s 
business. After all, positive results of impact assessments could also prove that the flexibility 
inherent in the ten principles “pays off”. 
Including Financial Markets. Finally, there is the challenge of winning financial markets 
over to base future investment decisions – to a much larger extent than at present – on social and 
environmental criteria. Although empirical research offers mixed results when it comes to the 
relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and long-term financial performance 
(ranging from no significant relation [Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield, 1985] to a significant 
positive relation [Waddock & Graves, 1997]), a meta-analysis by Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes 
(2003) finds a generally positive impact of CSP on firms’ financial performance across industries 
and across study contexts. This perspective is also in line with a recent study by Goldman Sachs 
(2007) which finds that business leadership on social, environmental and governance issues can 
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contribute to better market performance. The Compact, by promoting the Principles for 
Responsible Investment (PRI), can help to set the right institutional framework for responsible 
investment-decisions. If institutional investors start acknowledging the PRI as a guideline for 
their decisions, the business case for the Compact will become more obvious. Of course, 
participation in the Compact should never be limited to the business case. However, future 
growth of the initiative will depend on the environment that is set by financial markets. 
Responsible investment decisions can lead to stable, accountable and thus profitable market 
conditions which should be in the enlightened self-interest of all market players – especially 
when considering the recent turbulence of mortgage markets around the world.   
 
Conclusions 
This article seeks to show that (a) the mass of critique of the Global Compact is often, yet 
by no means always, based on a misunderstanding of the very nature of the initiative as well as 
its underlying mandate; (b) there is need to give more credit to its supplementary nature with 
regard to state and non-state regulation and; (c) to ensure a continued, sustainable growth of the 
initiative many challenges need to be addressed. Being in its eighth year of operation now, the 
Compact has achieved much in a rather short period of time; it not only is the largest corporate 
citizenship initiative in terms of size but also the most inclusive one bringing together a diverse 
set of business and non-business stakeholders. In addition – and this may be one of the most 
valuable side effects of the set up of the Compact – its dynamic and flexible network-based 
governance structure can promote necessary reforms of the UN system from within. The 
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Christian Science Monitor (2000), for example, praised the Compact as being “the most creative 
reinvention” of the United Nations to date.  
Future conceptual and empirical research can and should support the evolution of the 
Compact. First, researchers can add expertise and insights to develop a more systemic and 
comprehensive impact assessment. Whereas there are a number of conceptual studies that 
introduce the content and governance structure of the Compact (Deva, 2006; Nolan, 2005; 
Thérien & Pouliot, 2006; Williams, 2004), there are almost no empirical insights on the 
implementation of the ten principles in corporations. The academic community can add much-
needed information by conducting studies about the impact of the Compact on existing business 
practices. One key question is, for instance, whether and how participating firms have changed 
existing routines (e.g., with regard to supplier relations). 
Second, academics can also add valuable knowledge on a more conceptual level. For 
instance, the contribution of the Compact as an institutional arrangement within the emerging 
system of global governance needs to be explored more closely. Addressing this topic 
necessitates discussing how the Compact relates to other institutional arrangements that have 
occurred recently (e.g., stakeholder management standards like AA1000) or are about to occur 
(e.g., the ISO 26000 guidelines; see also Gilbert & Rasche, 2008). Scholars can also add valuable 
insights when it comes to discuss why the Compact, because of its multi-stakeholder nature, is a 
meaningful and much-needed initiative that addresses declining public trust in traditional state-
centered political institutions. The discussion of legitimacy, as recently outlined by Palazzo & 
Scherer (2006), offers many interesting points of departure here. Third, future research should 
also advance the initiative itself by critically discussing its existing engagement mechanisms and 
underlying governance structure. It is our hope that these discussions will take up the issues 
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raised in this article to present arguments that consider the nature of the Compact together with 
its institutional setting to a greater extent.  
Without a doubt, the Compact has not yet achieved all of its goals. However, researchers 
and practitioners should give credit to the fact that neither its goals nor its underlying structure 
exist in a stable environment and thus reflect steady solutions. A start has been made and the 
point of departure taken by the initiative is a very promising one. The Compact is by no means a 
sufficient concept to ensure governance in a global economy, however only a small part of the 
overall solution (Rasche, 2009; United Nations, 2004). Whether the Compact succeeds in 
creating a more inclusive global economy that is embedded in a framework of fundamental, yet 
indispensable, values remains an open issue. Even the most ambitious journey has to start 
somewhere and the Global Compact has already helped to propagate the seeds of an emerging 
solution. History will be the judge on its success.  
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